Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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MORNING MEETING - 18 July 1979

The DCI was in the chair.

l. I reminded people that the Soviet dilemma in Afghanistan has not been resolved and indeed was worse.

7/8

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MORNING MEETING - 29 June 1979

The DDCI was in the chair.

1. I called attention to the potential dangers arising out of the Pakistani nuclear program. The more attention is called to it, the more alarmed the Indians will become. Given that they have fought two wars with Pakistan in the last 15 years and that the military balance is even more in their favor than before, they will be strongly motivated to prevent Pakistani acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by military force.

6729

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MORNING MEETING - 18 June 1979

7/18 4 20

1. I did not brief.

MORNING MEETING - 20 June 1979

1. I did not brief.

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MORNING MEETING - 18 June 1979

The DCI was in the chair.

1. I did not brief.

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MORNING MEETING - 11 June 1979

1. I did not brief

MORNING MEETING - 11 June 1979

The DDCI was in the chair.

1. I called attention to indications of increased Soviet activity in Afghanistan.

25X1

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MORNING MEETING - 11 June 1979

The DCI was in the chair.

l. I got the DCI's approval for doing the Nicaraguan Alert Memorandum.



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MORNING MEETING - 4 June 1979

The DCI was in the chair.

1. I reported that the coup in Ghana seemed to be unsuccessful and noted Vorster's resignation.

MORNING MEETING - 6 June 1979

The DDCI was in the chair.

l. I noted how wrong I had been about the coup in Ghana and said it was at least a possibility that what we might be getting here is another next of Cubans and Soviets. There was also some possibility of a spillover into Nigeria, and we will be watching developments closely.

MORNING MEETING - 8 June 1979

The DDCI was in the chair.

1. I reported that our present assessment of the Somoza government's ability to contain the insurrection was changing. The Sandinistas were getting better support and especially better advice and were succeeding in drawing the national guard out of Managua and wearing it down. We sould probably be bringing forward an Alert Memorandum.



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